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I. Introduction 
The purpose of this document is to describe a set of preliminary high level requirements that the 
SecureCore hardware base (SCHW) must satisfy.   To provide a coherent view of the desired 
hardware features, the features described herein include those that are currently available (“C”), 
are part of the next generation (“N” e.g., Intel’s VTx), and those proposed for the future (“F”).1 
In regard to the latter, we are currently engaged in NDA-level discussions with Intel. This 
document assumes the reader is familiar with the SecureCore architecture provided in the 
SecureCore project description [1].   
 
II. SCHW Architecture Overview 
A SecureCore component is intended to be a mobile networked device capable of operating in 
different modes with different levels of trust.  Security features implemented in the SecureCore 
architecture must minimize changes to existing application-level software to promote rapid user 
acceptability.  The current trend in hardware-assisted virtualization technology focuses mainly 
on processor virtualization for consolidation of workstations with different OSs and for fail-over 
purposes [2].  Since many other components within the workstation platform (i.e., on or attached 
to the motherboard) affect its security operation, the SCHW architecture will address 
virtualization issues of the entire platform, not just the processor.  Furthermore, the proposed 
hardware features will afford mobile platforms with virtualization technology that is currently 
only available in servers and high-end desktops. 
The SecureCore platform must be able to provide the following capabilities. 
A. Hardware virtualization 
This capability must support Type I Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) software architecture that 
can host multiple unmodified virtual machines (VMs) [3].  For the SecureCore project, we are 
exploring an architecture in which the LPSK and SCSS layers form a Type I VMM; the VMs are 
the guest commercial operating systems and the native (SecureCore) operating system. 
The virtualization mechanism must provide a way for the VMM to virtualize all system 
resources such as processor, memory (including cache and TLB), interrupts, and I/O devices.  In 
particular, hardware support for VM scheduling, as well as task scheduling within a VM, is 
required. (F)   
B. Protected processing environment 
The processor architecture must provide the following: 
1. Support for a partially ordered privilege domain architecture, with at least 4 VM privilege 
domains and 2 VMM privilege domains.  The VM privilege domains are available to 
both the VMs and VMM whereas the VMM privilege domains are only available to the 
                                                                 
1 Due to the research nature of these requirements, their imposition, interactions and tradeoffs will require 
continuing examination, especially for those designated as future (F). 
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VMM. (N) 
2. Support for distinct execution entities (viz., multitasking). (C) 
3. A method to partition the modules of a task into different privilege domains. (C) 
4. A method for the processor to transfer control directly to the LPSK when a non-
privileged portion of a task attempts to execute a privileged instruction that might violate 
the security policy. (C) 
5. A method for virtualizing the interrupts handling mechanism, including support for 
hardware-assisted virtualization of the interrupt controller chip. (F) 
6. A method for restricting access to I/O devices. (C)   
C. Protected memory management 
The platform MMU must provide the following: 
1. Support virtual memory. (C) 
2. A method to implement distinct, protected per-VM and per-task address spaces. (C) 
3. A method to enforce fine-grained memory protection policy.  Access to memory will be 
based on hardware attributes such as privilege levels and access modes.(C) 
4. A method to restrict per-device DMA access. (N) 
5. A method to prevent information leakage through memory areas (system memory, cache, 
and Flash) between VMs, including timing issues. (N) 
D. Secure I/O channels 
The platform must provide mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of 
communications between the I/O devices and other components on the platform.  Minimally, 
secure channels must be provided for the following I/O devices: keyboard, console display 
device, USB devices, and network interface cards. (N) 
E. Secure boot 
The platform must provide the following: 
1. A mechanism to ensure the integrity of the BIOS code and data that can be used by a 
ratcheting bootstrap scheme [4], e.g., a “secure root of trust” such as might be provided 
by the SP extension discussed in Section 2.7. (F) 
2. A privileged mechanism to disable selected privileged operations as the operating system 
initialization progresses, which could not be reset until the processor was re-
initialized.(F)  This feature would provide hardware protection against modification of 
structures that should not change after initialization – such as the x86 LDT for a static 
separation kernel. 
F. Secure system maintenance 
Most modern platforms support a special execution mode, i.e., system maintenance mode, which 
can bypass all protections on platform resources (e.g., memory, I/O devices). A typical use of 
this mode is to implement various power saving mechanisms (e.g., powering down unused 
devices, putting the system to sleep or hibernation). The SC platform must provide mechanisms 
Preliminary Security Requirements for SecureCore Hardware 
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to control the invocation of this special mode as well as to protect platform resources and prevent 
information leakage between VMs when it is invoked.  (F) 
G. Concealed execution mode 
The platform must support the integration of the Secret Protected (SP) architecture to provide a 
safe environment for per-user cryptographic processing [5].  The original SP design must be 
enhanced to support virtualization to prevent covert channels.  The SecureCore “SP 
virtualization” technical report describes a set of proposed enhancements to virtualize the SP 
component [6]. (F)  Additionally, we are working with the SecureCore East team on an SP 
extension to support high integrity enterprise keys, which will support the “transient trust” 
functions of the SP architecture. 
H. Trusted platform attestation 
The platform must support the integration of a trustworthy hardware attestation component to 
provide the ability to attest, at a minimum, the presence of the VMM. (N) 
I. Hardware isolation of security critical functions 
We plan to work with hardware vendors to extend the current multicore architecture to isolate 
processing units such that one or more units can be used securely for privileged mode processing 
(i.e., kernel functions), and for dedicated engines such as the SP and TPM.  This isolation feature 
will also facilitate concurrent execution of VMs, i.e., multiple VMs can be isolated by hardware 
and also execute at the same time. (F) 
 
III. Summary 
This document presents a preliminary set of high level requirements for the SCHW architecture.  
Table 1 characterizes the requirements with respect to their technological maturity.  
 
Table 1.  SecureCore Hardware Requirements 
Categories Requirements 
Currently available II.B.2, II.B.3, II.B.4, II.B.6, II.C.1, II.C.2, II.C.3 
Next generation II.B.1, II.C.4, II.C.5, II.D, II.H  
Future II.A, II.B.5, II.E.1, II.E.2, II.F, II.G, II.I 
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